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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellants appeal from the February 9, 1996, order of 
the district court granting summary judgment to plaintiff- 
appellee Joseph R. Walling and a class of persons he 
represents, and denying appellants' cross motion for 
summary judgment. Walling v. Brady, 917 F. Supp. 313 (D. 
Del. 1996). The district court held that the Board of 
Trustees ("Trustees") of an ERISA-qualified multi-employer 
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pension fund had abused its discretion when it amended its 
pension plan to authorize the payment of an additional 
$100 per month to only 85% of the fund participants rather 




The Plumbers and Pipefitters Local Union No. 74 Pension 
Fund ("Pension Fund") and the Trustees were sued by a 
class of 54 participants in the Pension Fund, with Walling 
appointed as the designated class representative. The 
plaintiffs asserted that the Trustees unlawfully diverted 
pension funds in violation of 29 U.S.C.A. § 1103(c)(1) (1985 
and Supp. 1997) and breached their fiduciary duty under 
29 U.S.C.A. § 1104. The eight individuals serving as 
trustees of the Pension Fund (four are appointed from the 
union, four from management) are the same eight people 
who serve as the trustees of the Plumbers and Pipefitters 
Local Union No. 74 Welfare Fund ("Welfare Fund"). The 
management representatives to the boards of trustees are 
appointed by the Delaware Mechanical Contractors' 
Association, Inc., which represents the multiple employers 
who support the Pension Fund and the Welfare Fund. 
 
The Pension Fund is a defined-benefit plan. It does not 
have a "finite asset pool" and is able to incur unfunded 
liabilities. The employers and the Pension Fund jointly 
share liability for the fund's obligations. The provisions of 
the Pension Fund give the Trustees, collectively as plan 
administrator, wide latitude to 
 
[d]ecide all questions relating to the interpretation of 
the Trust Agreement and Plan. The exercise of 
discretion or determination of questions arising in the 
administration, interpretation and application of the 
Trust Agreement or Plan shall be final and binding 
except as otherwise provided by law. 
 
App. at 349-50. The plan administrator also may "[a]mend, 
alter or otherwise change the Pension Plan in any way not 
inconsistent with applicable laws or regulations of 
government agencies or the provisions of this Trust." Id. at 
350. 
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An actuarial consultant retained by the Trustees reported 
that successful investments had caused the Pension Fund 
to have a surplus. The Trustees were aware that the 
Welfare Fund was simultaneously faced with increased 
health care costs and that the Trustees had already 
decided, in their capacity as the Welfare Fund board of 
trustees, to impose a requirement that all Welfare Fund 
participants pay a $100 per month fee for their coverage, 
which previously had not required such a fee. The Trustees 
chose to address the imbalance between the funds by 
paying an additional $100 per month in benefits to those 
members of the Pension Fund who, by virtue of also being 
members of the Welfare Fund, would now have to pay $100 
each month to the Welfare Fund: "The Trustees openly 
concede that the motivation behind this additional $100 
per month Pension Fund benefit was to maintain the 
purchasing power of those retired Welfare Fund individuals 
who now shouldered an additional $100 monthly burden, 
presumably on a fixed income." Walling, 917 F. Supp. at 
317. The Trustees also noted that the Pension Fund did not 
reduce the benefits for Walling or any member of his class; 
indeed, all Pension Fund participants received a separate 
5% increase in benefits. The Walling class members, as well 
as all the other members of the Pension Fund, have 
received more than they had anticipated receiving from the 
Pension Fund upon retirement. The class members consist 
of Pension Fund members who do not also participate in 
the Welfare Fund; they retired without fulfilling sufficient 
years of service to qualify for Welfare Fund benefits. 
 
Walling and his class asserted that the surplus should 
have either been retained by the Pension Fund or 
distributed equally to all participants. They note that all 
Pension Fund members were faced with rising health care 
costs, regardless of whether they were Welfare Fund 
participants, and claimed that the payment of an 
additional, monthly $100 to only the 85% of Pension Fund 
members who are also Welfare Fund members was not a 
valid "Pension Fund interest." Id. at 322. 
 
The district court agreed with Walling. It held that 
appellants violated their fiduciary duty of loyalty in 
amending the plan to provide the supplemental $100 
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benefit. In so holding, the district court determined that 
appellants violated their duty of loyalty, whether that duty 
is reviewed under the strict " `prudent' person standard" or 
the more relaxed "arbitrary and capricious" standard. Id. at 
321. We will reverse. We hold that no fiduciary duty 
applies, and that the Trustees acted within their powers as 




Subject matter jurisdiction over this matter was exercised 
by the district court pursuant to 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132, as an 
action to clarify benefits and enforce rights under the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"). We 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 
(1984). This court exercises plenary review over the district 
court's grant of summary judgment. We will affirm 
summary judgment "if there is no genuine issue of material 
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Smith v. Hartford Ins. Group, 6 F.3d 131, 






The district court concluded that the fiduciary duty (set 
forth in 29 U.S.C.A. § 1104) applied to the Trustees' 
amendment to the Pension Fund plan, which provided for 
the additional $100 per month payment. It determined that 
the Trustees had failed to act with the duty and loyalty 
required of a fiduciary. In the view of the district court, 
under either the "prudent person" or the "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard of review, the Trustees' actions were 
improper. The court based its decision largely on a 
perceived difference between multi- and single-employer 
plans, citing dicta in Siskind v. Sperry Retirement Program, 
Unisys, 47 F.3d 498, 506 (2d Cir. 1995). Siskind states that 
multi-employer plans differ from single-employer plans on 
the issue of fiduciary obligations. As the Second Circuit 
explained: 
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The cases holding plan amendment to be an 
administrative and fiduciary task concern 
multiemployer pension plans, jointly administered by 
trustees representing the employers and trustees 
appointed by and representing the union. In the 
multiemployer setting, trustees amending a pension 
plan affect the allocation of a finite plan asset pool . . . . 
For that reason trustees administering a multiemployer 
plan are expected to act solely for the benefit of 
beneficiaries and are barred from acting on the 
employers' behalf. 
 
Id. (emphasis added)(citations and internal quotations 
omitted). In contrast, the employer sponsoring a single- 
employer plan, "must have latitude in the sound 
management of its business to determine the benefits it will 
guarantee." Id. at 505 (citing Johnson v. Georgia-Pacific 
Corp., 19 F.3d 1184, 1188 (7th Cir. 1994)). The court then 
held, "to the extent [the trustees' actions are] not regulated 
by ERISA, they may act without invoking their fiduciary 




Arguments are advanced by both parties concerning 
whether the Siskind approach (analyzing single- and multi- 
employer cases differently) has been made obsolete by the 
Supreme Court's recent decision in Lockheed Corp. v. 
Spink, ____ U.S. ____, 116 S.Ct. 1783 (1996), which was 
filed after the district court entered the appealed-from 
order. In Lockheed, the Supreme Court explained that: 
 
Plan sponsors who alter the terms of a plan do not fall 
into the category of fiduciaries. As we said with respect 
to the amendment of welfare benefit plans . . . 
"[e]mployers or other plan sponsors are generally free 
under ERISA, for any reason at any time, to adopt, 
modify, or terminate welfare plans." When employers 
undertake those actions, they do not act as fiduciaries, 
but are analogous to the settlors of a trust. 
 
___ U.S. at ___, 116 S.Ct. at 1789 (citations 
omitted)(alteration in original). The Court made clear that 
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this reasoning applied to both "pension benefit plans" and 
"welfare benefit plans." Id. at 1789-90. 
 
Lockheed speaks of "plan sponsors," a term that applies 
to both single-employer sponsors and multi-employer 
sponsors under ERISA, and the opinion lacks any hint that 
single- and multi-employer plans should be analyzed 
differently. At the same time, the silence of Lockheed on 
this topic could arguably be a result of its subject matter, 
a single-employer plan. The Court did not mention multi- 
employer plans nor state that its decision was intended to 
reach them or to address their particular characteristics. 
 
While we do not read Lockheed to be the definitive word 
that there are never valid occasions on which to distinguish 
between the two types of plans, we find that the instant 
case is clearly one in which the fiduciary duty does not 
apply. Lockheed states in simple language that "[p]lan 
sponsors who alter the terms of a plan do not fall into the 
category of fiduciaries." Id. at 1789. The plan feature (a 
finite asset pool) on which Siskind based its deviation from 
this bright-line rule is not present here. 
 
In discussing the distinction between single- and multi- 
employer plans, Siskind drew heavily on the Sixth Circuit's 
opinion in Musto v. American General Corp., 861 F.2d 897, 
912 (6th Cir. 1988). Musto placed importance on the fact 
that a multi-employer plan involves a finite asset pool. 
However, before Siskind was decided, the Sixth Circuit 
issued Pope v. Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas 
Health and Welfare Fund, 27 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1994). Pope 
did not place emphasis on the "finite asset pool distinction" 
and found no reason to treat multi-employer and single- 
employer plans differently when the sponsor of either is 
merely amending its plan: 
 
[A]mendment of multi-employer plans does not 
[materially] differ from amendment of single-employer 
plans. . . . A company "normally acts in its role as 
employer, not in its role as fiduciary" when amending 
a single-employer plan. Musto, 861 F.2d at 912. 
Imposition of fiduciary obligations in favor of plan 
participants and beneficiaries would thus divide the 
company's loyalties, a result ERISA was designed to 
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prevent. The trustees of a multi-employer plan do not 
act in the role of employers when enacting plan 
amendments which simply affect the allocation of an 
asset pool among participants and beneficiaries. See 
Musto, 861 F.2d at 912. However, multi-employer plan 
trustees assume a position analogous to that of a 
single-employer plan administrator when they amend a 
plan to protect its financial stability. As in cases 
involving single-employer plans, the policy encouraging 
employers to establish welfare benefit plans is served 
by permitting trustees of multi-employer plans to 
amend such plans without fiduciary considerations. 
Furthermore, and again like cases involving single- 
employer plans, imposition of fiduciary obligations in 
cases involving multi-employer plans would divide the 
trustees' loyalties and might keep them from pressing 
for generous welfare plan benefits. 
 
Pope, 27 F.3d at 213-14 (citations omitted). 
 
As noted above, the Pension Fund is a multi-employer 
plan that does not have a "finite asset pool," yet the 
presence of such a pool is the sole reason Siskind 
articulated for distinguishing between single- and multi- 
employer plans. Pope stands for the proposition that the 
Sixth Circuit, despite its authorship of Musto, is prepared 
to treat single- and multi-employer plans similarly in the 
absence of some other salient difference. In the instant 
case, the employers and the Pension Fund jointly share 
liability for the fund's obligations. The rationale for having 
the fiduciary duty of loyalty apply is therefore absent, 
because the Trustees have the power to incur unfunded 
liabilities, as with any settlor or grantor in a single- 
employer trust. All employers in a multi-employer plan are 
collectively a single employer in the language of 29 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1060 (explaining that other ERISA sections should "be 
applied as if all employees of each of the employers were 
employed by a single employer"). Section 1002(16)(B) of 
ERISA uses the term "plan sponsor" rather than 
"employer," indicating that the term "sponsor" is meant to 
encompass more than single employers: 
 
The term "plan sponsor" means (I) the employer in the 
case of an employee benefit plan established or 
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maintained by a single employer . . . or (iii) in the case 
of a plan established or maintained by two or more 
employers or jointly by one or more employers and one 
or more employee organizations, the association, 
committee, joint board of trustees, or other similar 
group of representatives of the parties who establish or 




The distinction embraced in dicta by Siskind, and relied 
upon by the district court, was due to its finding a material 
difference in the administration of single- and multi- 
employer plans. Finding no such difference here, we hold 
that the simple fact that the plan at issue is a multi- 
employer plan is insufficient to cause the fiduciary duty to 




The principal reason that the fiduciary duty typically 
attaches to the actions of plan trustees--that their action is 
administrative or discretionary in character--is absent 
here. ERISA draws a distinction between employers 
modifying their plans ("plan modifiers") on the one hand, 
and fiduciaries exercising the discretion vested in them as 
plan administrators, on the other. The single-/multi- 
employer distinction described in the foregoing paragraphs 
is a byproduct of this more central distinction. Musto noted 
the interconnectedness of these two sets of distinctions: 
 
In amending a multi-employer plan, where the level of 
contributions of each participating employer has 
generally been set by collective bargaining, the trustees 
"affect the allocation of a finite plan asset pool between 
participants," as defendants point out in their brief, 
and hence act as plan administrators subject to a 
fiduciary duty. But when, as here, there is only one 
employer, there is normally no "plan asset pool" to be 
affected. In amending a single employer plan, therefore, 
the company normally acts in its role as employer, not 
in its role as fiduciary. 
 
861 F.2d at 912. 
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In the instant case, the district court properly placed 
emphasis on the fiduciary-administrator/employer-plan 
modifier dichotomy. "[W]hen employers wear `two hats' as 
employers and administrators, `they assume fiduciary 
status "only when and to the extent" that they function in 
their capacity as plan administrators, not when they 
conduct business that is not regulated by ERISA.' " Walling, 
917 F. Supp. at 319 (first alteration in original)(quoting 
Curcio v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 33 F.3d 226, 234 
n.10 (3d Cir. 1994)(quoting Payonk v. HMW Indus., Inc., 
883 F.2d 221, 225 (3d Cir. 1989)(citations omitted)). As to 
the meaning of "business . . . not regulated by ERISA," id., 
we stated in Nazay v. Miller, "ERISA's concern is with the 
administration of benefit plans and not with the precise 
design of the plan." 949 F.2d 1323, 1329 (3d Cir. 
1991)(citing Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 
1155, 1159 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990)). Similarly, the Supreme 
Court explained in Varity Corp. v. Howe, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 
116 S.Ct. 1065, 1071 (1996), that 
 
a "person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan," and 
therefore subject to ERISA fiduciary duties, "to the 
extent" that he or she "exercises any discretionary 
authority or discretionary control respecting 
management" of the plan, or "has any discretionary 
authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration" of the plan. ERISA § 3(21)(A) [29 
U.S.C.A. 1002(21)(A)]. Varity was both an employer and 
the benefit plan's administrator [,] 
 
and was therefore acting as a fiduciary only to the extent it 
acted as an administrator. In Lockheed, the Court 
concluded that "the act of amending a pension plan does 
not trigger ERISA's fiduciary provisions." 116 S.Ct. at 1790. 
This approach was acknowledged by the district court: 
 
Courts have reasoned that an employer who is also a 
plan administrator acts as a fiduciary only when it 
functions in its capacity as plan administrator, not 
when it conducts business that is not regulated by 
ERISA. Because ERISA does not require the creation of 
employee pension plans in the first instance, an 
employer who designs, amends, or terminates a 
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pension benefit plan is not "administering"[the] plan 
and thus does not act as a fiduciary. 
 
Walling, 917 F. Supp. at 319-20 (citations omitted). 
Nonetheless, the district court failed to recognize the result 
dictated by this distinction. Because the Trustees were not 
administering the plan, their amendment was not a 
fiduciary act. 
 
The jurisprudence of this area is marked by the drawing 
of a sharp distinction between 1) the sponsors of a plan 
acting as an administrator (which is discretionary and 
therefore fiduciary) and 2) the sponsors of a plan amending, 
altering, terminating, or otherwise redesigning the plan 
itself (functions considered to be not discretionary and 
therefore not fiduciary).1 "Discretion" for the purpose of 
determining the applicability of fiduciary obligations means 
solely that the plan administrator is making a choice 
reserved to it by the plan document in administering the 
plan, not tinkering with the plan document itself. 
 
These dichotomies, single-employer/multi-employer and 
employer/fiduciary, are useful as guideposts in determining 
whether the fiduciary duty applies. In the particular matter 
before us, the employer/fiduciary dichotomy unequivocally 
tells us that the Trustees were not acting as a fiduciary 
when they amended the Pension Fund's plan design. ERISA 
clearly states, in pertinent part: 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See, e.g., Fagan v. National Stabilization Agreement of Sheet Metal 
Indus. Trust Fund, 60 F.3d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1995); Izzarelli v. Rexene 
Prods. Co., 24 F.3d 1506, 1524-25 (5th Cir. 1994); United Paperworkers 
Int'l Union v. Jefferson Smurfit Corp., 961 F.2d 1384, 1386 (8th Cir. 
1992); McGann v. H & H Music Co., 946 F.2d 401, 407 (5th Cir. 1991); 
Hozier, 908 F.2d at 1160-61; Musto v. American Gen. Corp., 861 F.2d at 
912 ("[W]hen an employer decides to establish, amend, or terminate a 
benefits plan, as opposed to managing any assets of the plan and 
administering the plan in accordance with its terms, its actions are not 
to be judged by fiduciary standards."); Young v. Standard Oil (Indiana), 
849 F.2d 1039, 1045 (7th Cir. 1988) ("In short, an employer does not 
owe its employees a fiduciary duty when it amends or abolishes a 
severance benefit plan."); Cunha v. Ward Foods, Inc., 804 F.2d 1418, 
1432-33 (9th Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Amoco Oil Co., 799 F.2d 1464, 1471 
(11th Cir. 1986); Amato v. Western Union Int'l, Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1417 
(2d Cir. 1985). 
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Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a 
person is a fiduciary with respect to a plan to the 
extent (I) he exercises any discretionary authority or 
discretionary control respecting management of such 
plan or exercises any authority or control respecting 
management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders 
investment advice for a fee . . . or has any authority or 
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary 
authority or discretionary responsibility in the 
administration of such plan. 
 
29 U.S.C.A. § 1002(21)(A) (emphasis added). None of the 
above-described situations that give rise to thefiduciary 




We reject the district court's statement that the 
"[t]rustees enacted the amendment to advance non-Pension 
Fund interests." Walling, 917 F. Supp. at 322. The court 
simply identified the wrong criteria: since the Trustees, as 
settlors, were free to scrap the plan altogether, they were 
free to advance non-Pension Fund interests in making 
design changes to it. 
 
In sum, the ERISA fiduciary obligations simply do not 
apply to a plan amendment. See Lockheed, 116 S.Ct. at 
1789. The Trustees, acting collectively as settlor, were free 
to make any amendment that did not run afoul of relevant 
ERISA regulations. No such regulation was implicated here. 
See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. § 1054(g)(amendment generally may 
not decrease accrued plan benefits) and § 1085b (if 
adoption of an amendment results in underfunding of a 
defined benefit plan, the sponsor must post security for the 
amount of the deficiency). Walling and his class had no 
accrued or vested benefits that were affected by the 
Trustees' actions. The Pension Fund plan explicitly states: 
 
12.04  No Vesting in Assets.  No person other than 
the Trustees of the Pension Fund shall have any right, 
title, or interest in any of the income or property of any 
funds received or held by or for the account of the 
Pension Fund, and no person shall have any vested 
right to benefits provided by the Pension Plan . .. . 
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For the reasons stated herein, we will reverse the 
February 9, 1996, order of the district court. The matter 
will be remanded to the district court with a direction to 
enter an order granting the Trustees' motion for summary 
judgment. 
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